Professor Noam Chomsky
The Israel-Palestine negotiations
currently underway in Jerusalem (al-Quds) coincide with the 20th anniversary of
the Oslo Accords.
A look at the character of the
accords and their fate may help explain the prevailing skepticism about the
current exercise.
In September 1993, President Clinton
presided over a handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and
Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat on the White House
lawn - the climax of a "day of awe," as the press described it.
The occasion was the announcement of
the Declaration of Principles for political settlement of the Israel-Palestine
conflict, which resulted from secret meetings in Oslo that were sponsored by
the Norwegian government.
Public negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians had opened in Madrid in November 1991, initiated by
Washington in the triumphal glow after the first Iraq war. They were stalemated
because the Palestinian delegation, led by the respected nationalist Haidar
Abdul Shafi, insisted on ending Israel's expansion of its illegal settlements
in the Occupied Territories.
In the immediate background were
formal positions on the basic issues released by the PLO, Israel and the United
States. In a November 1988 declaration, the PLO called for two states on the
internationally recognized border, a proposal that the United States had vetoed
at the Security Council in 1976 and continued to block, defying an overwhelming
international consensus.
In May 1989 Israel responded,
declaring that there can be no "additional Palestinian state" between
Jordan and Israel (Jordan being a Palestinian state by Israeli dictate), and
that further negotiations will be "in accordance with the basic guidelines
of the [Israeli] Government." The Bush I administration endorsed this plan
without qualifications, then initiated the Madrid negotiations as the
"honest broker."
Then in 1993, the DOP was quite
explicit about satisfying Israel's demands but silent on Palestinian national
rights. It conformed to the conception articulated by Dennis Ross, Clinton's
main Middle East Advisor and negotiator at Camp David in 2000, later President
Obama's main advisor as well. As Ross explained, Israel has needs but
Palestinians only have wants, obviously of lesser significance.
Article I of the DOP states that the
end result of the process is to be "a permanent settlement based on
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338," which say nothing about
Palestinian rights, apart from a vague reference to a "just settlement of
the refugee problem."
If the "peace process"
unfolded as the DOP clearly stated, Palestinians could kiss goodbye their hopes
for some limited degree of national rights in the Land of Israel.
Other DOP articles stipulate that
Palestinian authority extends over "West Bank and Gaza Strip territory,
except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations:
Jerusalem, settlements, military locations and Israelis" - that is, except
for every issue of significance.
Furthermore, "Israel will
continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and
public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians
may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho
area," the two areas from which Israel was pledged to withdraw -
eventually.
In short, there would be no
meaningful changes. The DOP also did not include a word about the settlement
programs at the heart of the conflict: Even before the Oslo process, the
settlements were undermining realistic prospects of achieving any meaningful
Palestinian self-determination.
Only by succumbing to what is
sometimes called "intentional ignorance" could one believe that the
Oslo process was a path to peace. Nevertheless, this became virtual dogma among
Western commentators.
As the Madrid negotiations opened,
Danny Rubinstein, one of Israel's best-informed analysts, predicted that Israel
and the United States would agree to some form of Palestinian
"autonomy," but it would be "autonomy as in a POW camp, where the
prisoners are 'autonomous' to cook their meals without interference and to
organize cultural events." Rubenstein turned out to be correct.
The settlement programs continued
after the Oslo Accords, at the same high level they had reached when Yitzhak
Rabin became prime minister in 1992, extending well to the east of illegally
annexed Greater Jerusalem.
As Rabin explained, Israel should
take over "most of the territory of the Land of Israel [the former
Palestine], whose capital is Jerusalem."
Meanwhile the US and Israel moved to
separate Gaza from the West Bank by closing access to it, in explicit violation
of the terms of the accords, thus ensuring that any potential Palestinian
entity would be cut off from the outside world.
The accords were followed by
additional Israel-PLO agreements, which spelled out more clearly the terms of
the autonomy of the POW camp. After Rabin's assassination, Shimon Peres became
prime minister. As Peres left office in 1995, he assured the press that there
would be no Palestinian state.
Norwegian scholar Hilde Henriksen
Waage concluded that the "Oslo process could serve as the perfect case
study for flaws" of the model of "of third party mediation by a small
state in highly asymmetrical conflicts. The question to be asked is whether
such a model can ever be appropriate."
That question is well worth
pondering, particularly as educated Western opinion now follows the ludicrous
assumption that meaningful Israel-Palestine negotiations can be seriously
conducted under the auspices of the United States - not an "honest
broker," but in reality a partner of Israel.
As the current negotiations opened,
Israel at once made its attitude clear by expanding the "National Priority
List" for special subsidies to settlements scattered in the West Bank and
by carrying forward its plans to build a train line to integrate the
settlements more closely into Israel.
Obama followed suit by appointing as
chief negotiator Martin Indyk, a close associate of Dennis Ross, whose
background is as a lobbyist for Israel and who explains that Arabs are unable
to comprehend the "idealism" and "generosity of spirit"
that infuse all of Washington's efforts.
The negotiations provide a cover for
Israel's takeover of the territories it wishes to control and should spare the
United States some further embarrassment at the United Nations. That is,
Palestine may agree to defer initiatives that would enhance its U.N. status -
which the U.S. would be compelled to block, joined by Israel and perhaps Palau.
It is, however, unlikely that the
negotiations will advance the prospects for a meaningful peace settlement.
Written by Professor Noam Chomsky
for www.alternet.org
هیچ نظری موجود نیست:
ارسال یک نظر